

HUMAN FRONTIER

How much of your
last decision was
actually yours?

The AI will never be blamed. You will.

AI makes you powerful. Judgement makes you irreplaceable.

APPROVED BY

DATE

READ, OR CHECKED?

OLIVIER LAURENT

HUMAN FRONTIER

How much of your last decision was actually yours?

OLIVIER LAURENT

Free excerpt: chapter 1.

© 2026 Olivier Laurent.

humanfrontier.ai

The certain risk

Everyone is worried AI will make a mistake. That is the wrong worry.

Here is the right one. It is late on a Thursday. A recommendation is open on your screen: four pages, clean headings, a summary you agree with, a number that matches what you expected. You drafted it with an AI system, or someone on your team did. You read it once. Nothing jumped out. Your name goes at the bottom, and in about ten seconds you will press send. Now ask yourself one question you have never been asked: what, exactly, did you check?

Not read. Check. Which number did you trace back to its source? Which assumption did you say out loud and test? Which paragraph did you disagree with, even briefly, before you let it stand? If the honest answer is “none, but it looked right”, then you have just met the risk this book is about. It is not that the AI was wrong. It may not have been. It is that you signed something you did not examine, and if it turns out to be wrong, the AI will never be blamed. You will.

I am going to give this risk a name, because it does not have one in the public conversation: automation bias with a human signature.

It does not look like a risk. It looks like Tuesday.

Yesterday’s memo: three paragraphs summarising a supplier negotiation, drafted from the call notes, sent to your director. It said the supplier had “agreed in principle” to the revised terms. Nobody on the call remembers them agreeing to anything; the notes said they

would “consider” it. The memo read better than the notes, so the memo won.

The forecast in last week’s board pack: a growth curve built from a model’s reading of the last three years, with a footnote nobody expanded. The footnote assumed the largest account renews on the same terms. The account manager, who was not asked, could have said in a sentence that it will not.

The contract clause nobody re-read because it read fine: a liability cap, rewritten for clarity, that now applies to a different party than the one it applied to before. It is grammatical. It is clear. It is wrong, and it has been initialled.

None of these is a story about AI making a mistake. In two of the three the AI did nothing wrong; it produced a plausible reading of thin input. Each is a story about a person who read, agreed, and signed, and who will be the only name anyone remembers when the question comes back. Nobody decided to hand over their judgment. It left one paragraph at a time.

An old bias, wearing a new disguise

Automation bias is not a discovery of the AI age. It is the tendency of a person working with an automated system to give that system’s output more weight than the evidence deserves, and to stop generating independent checks once the system has spoken. Researchers described it in aviation cockpits in the 1980s, long before anyone had heard of a language model. Bainbridge, writing about the “ironies of automation” in 1983, found something that still sounds backwards: the more reliable an automated system becomes, the less practice its human operator gets, and the worse that operator performs at the rare moment intervention is actually needed. Reliability does not make the human safer. It makes the human worse. Parasuraman and Manzey, reviewing decades of that research in 2010, found the pattern held from flight decks to medical diagnosis: automated aids that are usually right make their human supervisors worse at catching the times they are wrong.

None of that research was about generative AI. It did not need to be. The mechanism is a relationship between a person and a system

whose output looks trustworthy, not a property of any particular technology. What generative AI adds is not a new bias. It is a new intensity and a new disguise.

The intensity: a cockpit autopilot fails rarely and announces itself when it does. An AI system produces an answer every time you ask, instantly, in the register of a confident expert, whether or not the underlying reasoning holds. There is no failure signal in the interface. The wrong output looks exactly like the right one.

The disguise is the part I want you to sit with. A calculator gives you a number. A GPS gives you a route. Neither produces something that reads like your own thinking. Their nature is transparent: you know what you are delegating. Knowingly delegating to a tool whose nature and limits you know remains a decision you can explain and defend; that is not the delegation this book is about. And your company's approval changes nothing here: a "validated" generative AI is not a calculator. An AI output, by contrast, reads as if you had thought it. It arrives in full sentences, in a register you recognise, in a structure you would have chosen yourself: the recommendation, the reasoning, the caveats. When you read it, the experience is not "a machine told me this." It is closer to "this is what I would have concluded, said better and faster than I could have said it." That is the veil. Not a lie. A surface of coherence so smooth that you cannot tell, from the inside, whether you agree with the output or whether you have simply stopped generating the disagreement you would otherwise have had.

Why your carefulness does not help

You may be thinking that this happens to other people. Careless people. People who do not take their work seriously. Two cases say otherwise.

In *Mata v. Avianca*, lawyers filed a brief in a United States federal court containing case citations that did not exist. The citations had been generated by an AI system and never checked against a primary source. These were practising attorneys, working in the one profession whose entire craft is citing verified authority. *Mata v. Avianca* was not an outlier. A public database kept by the researcher Damien Charlotin counted 2,077 court decisions dealing with AI-

hallucinated content by 23 September 2026, 825 of them involving lawyers and 1,196 involving people representing themselves. In 2025, Deloitte Australia agreed to a partial refund, more than AU\$97,000, on a government contract worth about AU\$440,000, after the report it had delivered was found to contain fabricated references and a fabricated quotation from a court judgment; the department republished the report with the references corrected. These were consultants, producing the kind of document whose whole value is rigour.

If automation bias with a human signature only caught careless people, it would not be worth a book. It catches conscientious people doing normal work under normal pressure, and it catches them precisely because their conscientiousness is aimed, correctly in every other context, at the content of what they are reading rather than at the felt sense of having understood it.

That felt sense is the thing that has broken, and it helps to know why. Psychologists have long studied processing fluency: the ease with which a piece of text moves through your mind gets used, without your permission, as a stand-in for how true and how competent it is. Text that reads smoothly, in familiar rhythms, with a confident register, is judged more credible than the identical content presented awkwardly. For most of human history this was a reasonable shortcut, because producing a coherent, confident, well-structured argument required having thought it through. Fluency was evidence of thinking. That correlation is now gone. A model produces maximal fluency about a subject it has, in the relevant sense, never reasoned through, at the same fluency whether the claim is sound or false. Your heuristic cannot detect the difference, because the signal it reads, ease, is now present in both cases. No one sent out a notice. Being careful does not fix this, because carefulness runs on the same heuristic.

What a signature was for

Every automation-bias story ends the same way: a human being signed off. Not a machine acting alone. A person with a name, a role and a professional obligation, who approved, shipped, submitted

or recommended. That signature is supposed to be evidence of a specific event: a human applied independent judgment to this and is accountable for having done so. It is the entire reason to have a human in the process. Not because humans are smarter than AI systems on narrow tasks; often they are not. Because a human can be held accountable in a way a system cannot, and accountability is only real if the judgment behind it actually happened.

Automation bias with a human signature is the failure in which the form of accountability survives and the substance does not. The person still signs. The form is unchanged. But the judgment was never exercised, because the output arrived already looking like judgment, and there was no visible seam where the person's own thinking was supposed to enter. Under time pressure, which is most of the time in most jobs, the path of least resistance is to let the seam close. You read a fluent, well-argued output, it matches your prior sense of the situation closely enough, and you sign. Not out of laziness. Out of a rational response to a system that has made disagreement expensive and agreement free.

Now multiply it. A recommendation drafted with AI assistance is approved by a manager who trusts fluency, escalated to a director who applies the same shortcut, and reaches a board with three signatures behind it, none of which is an independent check: three instances of the same unexamined trust, stacked, and mistaken for three acts of scrutiny. Ask any of the three whether they reviewed the document, and each will honestly say yes.

Regulators have started to name this. Article 14(4)(b) of the EU AI Act obliges the providers of high-risk AI systems to design them so that the people assigned to oversee them are enabled to remain aware of automation bias. That is a design obligation on the provider, for high-risk systems, on a timeline the 2026 AI Omnibus pushed back to December 2027, and I am not a lawyer; Part III says what it does and does not mean. For now, take only this: a piece of legislation had to specify “remain aware of automation bias” because its drafters had seen the same pattern and judged it common enough to require a defence.

Why “certain”, and not “speculative”

There is a version of the AI conversation I do not have. It goes: in some number of years, systems smarter than us will pursue goals we did not intend, and the outcome will be very bad. I am not going to argue with that prophecy, for or against. It depends on things that have not happened and might not: a trajectory of capability, a failure of controls, a timing nobody credibly claims to know. Reasonable, informed people disagree sharply about it, and this book cannot settle the disagreement.

Automation bias with a human signature depends on none of that. It requires three things that are already true, everywhere AI is used to inform a decision: AI produces fluent output, humans respond to fluency as a signal of quality, and decisions get made under time pressure. All three hold today, in your organisation, on an ordinary Tuesday. This is not a risk that might materialise if AI development goes a certain way. It materialises every time someone reads a competent-sounding paragraph and stops there.

Notice, too, what this does to the question everyone asks first: is the AI good enough yet? For this risk, the question is beside the point. A better model produces more fluent output, which closes the seam faster, not slower. Every improvement in the system’s reliability is, by Bainbridge’s irony, a small reduction in the practice its human gets at catching it. The question is never whether the AI is good enough. It is whether you are still in the loop, or only in the signature.

That is also why it is under-discussed relative to its size. It has no story. Nobody writes a headline about “manager approves AI-drafted recommendation that rested on an unstated assumption.” The failure is quiet, spread across millions of small approvals, and invisible even to the person who made it, because a fluent wrong answer does not announce itself. It sits there, signed, until something downstream breaks and someone has to explain what happened. At that point the explanation “the AI said so” is worth exactly nothing, and everyone in the room knows it.

What this book does instead

You cannot fix a broken fluency heuristic by trying harder to notice when it misfires. Noticing is the function that has been disabled. What you can do is stop relying on the heuristic at all, for the class of decision where being wrong costs something, and replace it with an external, repeatable sequence of checks that does not care how confident the output makes you feel.

Go back to the Thursday. The ten seconds before you press send are not, in fact, too short to hold a check. They are too short to hold a re-read, which is what most people attempt and abandon. A check is a different act, and a small one. Name the one number or claim the whole recommendation rests on, the one that, if wrong, makes the rest irrelevant. Say, in one sentence, what has to be true for that claim to hold, and notice whether the document says it or assumes it. Then name the person who could confirm it in a two-line message, and decide whether to send that message before or after your signature. That is the whole check at its smallest, and it takes about as long as reading this paragraph. It does not tell you whether the output is right. It tells you whether you know, and if the honest answer is that you do not, it tells you who does. Most signatures never get even this, not because ten seconds is too little, but because nobody told the signer what to do with them.

That sequence, grown to fit the stakes, is the rest of this book. Not a defence against AI being wrong; AI will sometimes be wrong whatever you do, and that is not the problem I am solving. A defence against the signature becoming a rubber stamp. A signature with a record behind it, a written set of assumptions with a named person to verify each one, a short list of open questions with an owner, is no longer a rubber stamp, however fluent the output that produced it. The record turns “I read it and it seemed fine” back into “I looked at this specifically, here is what I found, and here is what I still need to know.” Everything from chapter five onward is the mechanics of building that record without turning every decision into a research project.

I did not arrive at this from a theory of AI risk. I arrived at it from more than twenty years of commercial decisions in a regulated industry, and from my own drafting: everything I wrote with AI had to be

checked, and the checking kept failing in the same place. Not because I was careless. Because there was no method, and inventing one from scratch, under deadline, every time, is not a method. It is luck. So I built one, and I built it before I wrote this book. Everything generated while building it went through it. What survived is here.

BEFORE YOU CLOSE THIS CHAPTER

The next three chapters give you the frontier: the two frontiers that delimit three zones, the difference between reading and checking, and four profiles of the person who signs. One of the four is you, and chapter four ends with twelve questions that let you count how often you have already crossed your Human Frontier without noticing. Before you go there, run three questions on the output you signed most recently.

1. What made you stop checking at the point you stopped?
2. If someone whose job is to find the flaw asked you to defend that decision without ever referring to “AI said”, how long would the defence last?
3. Is there something on your desk right now that already reads as “basically right”, and if so, what is the one thing in it you have not actually verified?

The full book

This is chapter one of twelve. The full book, in English and French: humanfrontier.ai/#book

End of the excerpt

The complete book: coming soon.

humanfrontier.ai